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Abstract 
In  this  paper  we  consider  a model  for  redistribution  of  risk  by  means  of  reinsurance  contracts  as  well  as  financial 
assets.  There  is  an  important  difference  between  the  trade  on  financial  markets  and  the  trade  on  reinsurance 
markets.  The  trade  of  reinsurance  contracts  is  constrained  in  the  sense  that  agents  can  only  buy  reinsurance 
contracts  for  those  risks  that  they  insured  initially.  Such  a constraint  does  not  apply  for  financial  markets.  Therefore, 
the  existing  equilibrium  models  for  redistribution  of  risk  are  adapted  to  the  situation  where  financial  markets  are 
included  in  the  model,  where  the  trade  of  reinsurance  is  constrained  and  where  markets  are  potentially  incomplete. 
We  use  ‘General  Equilibrium  Theory  for  Incomplete  financial  markets’  to  prove  that  equilibria  exist  on  such  a mixed 
financial-reinsurance  market.  We  show  that  the  existence  of  constraints  on  the  reinsurance  portfolios  that  can  be 
traded  can  have  an  important  influence  on  the  structure  of  the  equilibrium  prices.  More  precisely,  we  show  that 
limited  arbitrage  possibilities  can  exist  at  equilibrium.  As  a  consequence,  there  does  not  necessarily  exist  a  risk 
neutral  probability  distribution.  Furthermore,  we  study  the  constrained  Pareto  optimality  of  the  equilibria. 
Key  words:  Optimal  reinsurance;  Incomplete  markets;  Trading  constraints;  Arbitrage  possibilities;  Constrained 
Pareto  optimality;  Risk  neutral  probability  distribution 
1.  Introduction 
It  is  well  known  that  in  general  insurance  agents  will  redistribute  the  insured  risks  amongst  each  other 
by  means  of  reinsurance  contracts.  In  doing  so,  they  try  to  optimize  their risk position,  given  the  prices  of 
reinsurance.  Vaguely  stated  (we  will  be  more  precise  in  the  sequel),  this  means  that  each  of  the  agents 
has  a  certain  rule  to  decide  whether  he  prefers  a  risk  position  to  another  risk  position.  According  to  this 
rule,  he  will  choose  his  ‘optimal’  risk  position. 
Rules  which  are  used  quite  often  to  ‘choose’  between  risk  positions  are  based  on  actuarial  calcula- 
tions.  This  means  that  several  stochastic  characteristics  of  a  risk,  such  as  its  mean  and  variance,  are 
calculated.  Prices  are  then  calculated  using  well-known  actuarial pricing principles.  Given  the  prices  for 
(rejinsurance  and  the  stochastic  characteristics  of  the  insured  risks,  the  agent  has  to  decide  upon 
reinsurance. 
In  De  Waegenaere  and  Delbaen  (1992),  the  authors  show  how,  for  stop  loss  reinsurance  contracts, 
these  rules  can  be  refined  using  conditional  expectation  and  conditional  variance  of  the  residual  risk. 
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Expected  value  and  variance  are  calculated  conditional  to  the  information  that  the  agent  has  about  the 
claim  height  process  at  that  time.  Furthermore,  the  optimal  hedge  between  residual  risk  and  reinsured 
risk  is  calculated.  These  three  criteria  allow  for  a  continuous  adjustment  of  the  reinsurance  portfolio. 
A  criticism  on  these  kind  of  rules  however,  is  that  they  are  only  based  on  the  stochastic  characteristics 
of  the  insured  risks,  and  therefore  don’t  keep  track  of  the  surrounding  market  conditions  such  as  the 
possibilities  on  the  financial  markets.  It  is  clear  however,  that  financial  markets  are  very  important  for 
insurers  and  reinsurers,  because  they  provide  a  means  to  invest  premiums.  Therefore,  it  would  be 
interesting  to  have  a  model  for  optimal  reinsurance  where  these  market  conditions,  as  well  as  the 
stochastic  characteristics  of  the  risks,  can  play  a role  in  determining  redistributions  of  risks  and  prices  for 
reinsurance  of  risks.  In  such  a  model,  agents  will  construct  a  financial  portfolio  and  a  risk  portfolio 
((re)insurances>  according  to  their  own  preferences.  Of  course,  these  ‘optimal’  choices  will  depend  on  the 
prices  of  the  financial  assets  and  the  (re)insurance  contracts  that  can  be  traded.  Now  the  question  is 
whether  prices  for  financial  assets  and  (re)insurance  contracts  can  be  found  such  that  this  behaviour  of 
the  agents  leads  to  an  equilibrium,  i.e.  the  net  trade  of  contracts  equals  zero. 
If  we  formulate  it  like  this,  it  becomes  clear  that  the  problem  fits  into  the  framework  of  General 
Equilibrium  Theory,  or  shortly  G.E.  theory.  Indeed,  G.E.  theory  is especially  concerned  with  the  existence 
of  equilibrium  prices  and  equilibrium  allocations  of  goods,  under  the  assumption  that  the  agents  each 
use  a  certain  rule  to  determine  their  optimal  position,  given  the  prices  of  the  goods.  The  word  ‘good’ 
should  be  interpreted  in  a broad  sense:  it  could  be  an  apple  as  well  as  a  random  payment  conditional  to 
the  occurrence  of  a  certain  event,  for  example  a  payment  if  a  house  burns  down. 
The  idea  of  applying  G.E.  theory  to  (re)insurance  markets  has  already  been  raised  by  several  other 
authors.  Some  very  interesting  papers  on  this  subject  are  Borch  (1962)  Biihlmann  (1980,  1984),  Gerber 
(1984),  Lienhard  (1986),  and  Pressacco  (1979).  In  Borch  (1990),  one  finds  a very  clear  explanation  of  how 
G.E.  theory  can  be  applied  to  the  (re)insurance  markets.  This  leads  to  very  nice  results  about  the 
structure  of  equilibrium  prices  for  (re)insurance  and  the  Pareto  optimal&  of  equilibrium  allocations  of 
risk. 
It  is  our  aim  in  this  paper  to  study  a  general  equilibrium  model  where  the  trade  on  reinsurance 
markets  is  combined  with  the  trade  on  financial  markets.  So  we  consider  a  mixed  financial-reinsurance 
market  with  two  types  of  agents,  (re)insurers  and  financial  agents.  This  market  is  considered  to  be 
potentially  incomplete  (see  for  instance  Magi11  and  Shafer  (1991)  for  a  definition  of  complete  and 
incomplete  markets).  This  means  that  we  allow  for  the  possibility  that  the  trade  of  reinsurance  is 
constrained  to  a  finite  number  of  standard  contracts  such  as  proportional,  excess  of  loss  or  stop  loss 
contracts.  The  complete  markets  case  (as  in  Biihlmann  (1980))  where  there  is  a  reinsurance  contract  for 
every  possible  risk,  and  therefore  even  for  risks  which  are  not  in  any  of  the  agents’  portfolios,  is  a  special 
case  of  our  model.  Furthermore,  as  opposed  to  the  existing  equilibrium  models  for  reinsurance,  we  don’t 
allow  (re)insurers  to  reinsure  risk  they  didn’t  insure  in  the  first  place.  So,  in  our  model,  we  take  into 
account  that,  as  opposed  to  financial  assets,  reinsurance  contracts  for  a  risk  can  only  be  bought  by  those 
(re)insurers  who  insured  the  risk  initially.  This  yields  a  model  where  the  trade  of  reinsurance  is 
constrained  by  asymmetric  constraints.  The  constraints  on  portfolio  holdings  are  asymmetric  because 
they  depend  upon  the  initial  risk  portfolio  of  the  agent.  The  reasons  we  are  interested  in  this  case  are  the 
following: 
-  We  believe  that  the  interaction  between  financial  markets  and  (re)insurance  markets  is  very  impor- 
tant.  One  obvious  reason  is  that,  in  the  absence  of  financial  markets,  (re)insurance  agents  would  not 
be  able  to  invest  their  premium  incomes. 
-  Since  (re)insurance  contracts  are  often  standardized  to  be  proportional,  excess  of  loss,  stop  loss,  or 
combinations  of  these,  it  seemsreasonable  to  assume  that  (re)insurance  markets  might  be  incomplete, 
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reinsurance  contracts  that  can  be  traded  belong  to  the  class  of  linear  combinations  of  a fixed  number 
of  standard  contracts. 
-  Recent  developments  in  the  theory  of  incomplete  markets  have  made  clear  that  if  the  trade  on  a 
certain  market  is constrained,  equilibrium  prices  need  not  necessarily  be  discounted  expected  values 
with  respect  to  a  risk  neutral  probability  distribution  (see  for  instance  De  Waegenaere  (1993)).  An 
important  consequence  is that  equilibrium  prices  of  reinsurance  are  not  necessarily  C.A.P.M.  prices. 
So  the  results  in  Miiller’s  paper  (Miiller,  1986)  are  no  longer  true  in  the  case  of  constrained  trade. 
Therefore,  it  becomes  clear  that  the  presence  of  trading  constraints  can  have  drastic  effects  on  the 
structure  of  the  equilibrium  prices. 
The  model  we  are  going  to  describe  in  this  paper  can  be  seen  as  an  extension  to  an  incomplete 
markets  framework  with  trading  constraints  of  models  previously  presented  by  Biihlmann  (1980,  1984) 
and  Gerber  (1984).  In  Biihlmann  (1980,  19841, the  author  used  G.E.  theory  to  determine  an  optimal 
redistribution  of  risks  and  corresponding  prices  for  reinsurance.  Since  this  idea  is fundamental  to  our 
model,  we will briefly  explain  it  in the  next  section. 
2. Biihlmann’s  economic  premium  principles 
Insurance  clearly  takes  place  in  a world  of  uncertainty.  Indeed,  premiums  are  deterministic,  but  the 
payoff  of  claim  heights  is stochastic.  In  a two  period  setting,  this  uncertainty  could  be  described  by the 
fact  that  there  are  a certain  number  of different  states  of  the  world  that  can  occur  at a later  date,  called 
date  one  in the  sequel.  We will denote  s for  a state  of the  world  and  R  for  the  set of all possible  states  of 
the  world.  A  risk  is therefore  described  by a stochastic  variable  X:  fl+  [w. 
Each  agent  i E {l,  2,. . . , I}  has  a  preference  relation  k  i  on  risks.  So  X % ‘Y  means  that  agent  i 
prefers  risk  X  to  risk  Y,  or  that  he  is  indifferent  between  the  two  risks.  Following  G.E.  theory,  a 
criterion  to  decide  upon  reinsurance  would  be  such  that,  given  the  prices  for  reinsurance,  each  agent 
would  reinsure  in  order  to  obtain  the  risk  position  that  maximizes  his  utility,  according  to  his  own 
preference  relation.  A  question  which  arises  then  naturally  is whether  prices  for  reinsurance  can  be 
found  such  that  these  optimization  processes  lead  to  market  clearing  in  risks.  Such  prices  are  called 
equilibrium  prices.  The  pricing  principle  leading  to  these  prices  is called  an  economic  premium  principle 
(as opposed  to  an  actuarial  premium  principle). 
Biihlmann  (1980,  1984)  used  G.E.  theory,  more  specifically  the  Walrasian  equilibrium  concept  of  a 
pure  exchange  economy,  to  obtain  an  economic  premium  principle.  More  precisely,  he  proves  that 
equilibrium  prices  for  reinsurance  exist  for  arbitrary  risk  averse  uon  Neumann-Morgenstern  utility 
functions.  ’  The  original  risk  (before  reinsurance)  of  an  agent  i  is  denoted  by  a  stochastic  variable 
X’ : 0  --) [w. So  X’(s)  denotes  the  claim  height  to  be  paid  by  the  agent  if  state  s  occurs  at  date  one. 
Redistribution  of risks  goes by means  of the  trading  of reinsurance  contracts  Z:  0  -+ [w.  By reinsuring  Z: 
0  +  [w,  agent  i can  transform  his original  risk  X’  into  a new  risk  Y (after  reinsurance)  given  by 
Y=X’-z. 
In Biihlmann  (1980,  1984) the  price  of reinsuring  Z:  R  +  [w  is considered  to be  a linear  functional  of the 
form 
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Here  P  is  a  given  probability  measure  on  0,  and  C$ is  called  the  price  density.  Let  wi:  0  +  R denote  the 
initial  wealth  of  agent  i.  Then  before  reinsurance,  the  date  one  wealth  of  an  agent  would  be  the 
stochastic  variable  w’-Xi:  R  +  R.  If  the  agent  buys  reinsurance  2  : R  +  R,  then  his  date  one  wealth 
would  be  the  stochastic  variable 
Each  agent  has  a von  Neumann-Morgenstern  utility  on  date  one  wealth  variables,  i.e.  there  exist  utility 
functions  u’:  R! -+  R,  such  that  for  variables  V,  W:  0  +  R,  one  has 
l’&V=E,[u’(V)]  zE#(W)]. 
Now  the  idea  of  G.E.  theory  is that  each  agent  will  choose  reinsurance  Z  in  order  to  maximize  the  utility 
of  his  date  one  wealth.  An  equilibrium  price  density  6  is  a  price  density  such  that  there  exist  risks  (Y’, 
Y;’ , . . . , PI)  satisfying 
Y’=  ~~ma;(EP[Ui(w’-Y-~~[Xi-Y])])  for  all  i~{1,2,...,1},  (la) 
i$lfL=  f:Xi  a.s. 
i=l 
(lb) 
Eq.  (la)  expresses  that  each  agent  chooses  reinsurance  Z  = Xi  -  Y;’ in  order  to  obtain  a  date  one  wealth 
which  maximizes  his  utility.  Eq.  (lb)  expresses  that  these  optimal  choices  must  lead  to  market  clearing. 
The  proof  of  existence  of  a  solution  of  (l),  i.e.  of  the  existence  of  an  equilibrium  price  density,  is 
established  in  Biihlmann  (1984)  for  arbitrary  risk-averse  utility  functions  u:  i E  (1,  2,.  . . , I).  Furthermore 
in  this  same  paper,  a  link  is  made  between  the  equilibrium  price  density  4  and  an  exponential  premium 
calculation  principle. 
Some  remarks  can  be  made  about  condition  (la): 
-  Markets  are  complete.  Indeed,  all  possible  reinsurance  contracts,  i.e.  all  possible  random  variables  Z: 
R  -+  R, can  be  traded.  In  general  however,  we  see  that  reinsurance  contracts  are  often  standardized  to 
be  either  proportional,  excess  of  loss,  stop  loss,  or  combinations  of  these. 
-  There  is  no  constraint  on  the  reinsurance  contracts  that  can  be  bought  by  an  agent.  So,  regardless  of 
his  initial  risk  portfolio,  the  agent  can  buy  reinsurance  contracts.  In  particular,  agents  are  allowed  to 
buy  reinsurance  contracts  for  risks  they  didn’t  insure  in  the  first  place. 
-  Prices  are  considered  to  be  expected  values  with  respect  to  some  price  density. 
-  There  is  essentially  only  one  time  period,  i.e.  prices  are  paid  when  risks  occur.  This  implies  that  one 
can’t  take  into  account  that  between  payment  of  premiums  and  occurrence  of  claims,  premiums  can  be 
invested,  for  instance  at  a  fixed  interest  rate. 
For  the  first  remark,  an  extension  of  Biihlmann’s  model  can  be  found  in  Gerber  (1984).  In  this  paper, 
the  author  considers  redistribution  of  risk  through  a  finite  number  of  fixed  reinsurance  contracts  Y,, 
Y2,...,  Y,.  So  agents  can  ‘only’  reinsure  linear  combinations  of  these  contracts,  i.e.  reinsurance  of  the 
form 
z=  &,  with  CjER,  jE{1,2  )...,  n). 
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This  implies  that  the  reinsurance  market  can be  incomplete  in this case.  Furthermore,  Biihlmann’s  model 
for  a  finite  state  space  R = 11, 2,. . . , S}  is  a  special  case  of  Gerber’s  model.  Indeed,  let  there  be  S 
contracts,  one  for  each  possible  state  s E (1, 2,. . . , S) at  date  one,  such  that 
y,(s)  =  1, 
Ys(t)  =o  Vt#s, 
then  it  is clear  that  one  gets  Biihlmann’s  model. 
The  other  remarks  hold  for  both  models  (the  fact  that  equilibrium  prices  in Gerber  (1984) in the  case 
of  a  finite  state  space  are  discounted  expected  values  with  respect  to  a  risk-neutral  probability 
distribution  cannot  be  seen  directly  from  the  model,  but  it  is  a  well-known  result  in  G.E.  theory  for 
incomplete  markets).  Therefore,  the  aim in this paper  is to  extend  these  models  to  a general  equilibrium 
model  for  the  reinsurance  market  where 
-  (re)insurance  markets  are  treated  as being  (potentially)  incomplete  markets, 
_  the  trade  on  (re)insurance  markets  is  constrained  by  institutional  rules  such  as  the  fact  that 
reinsurance  contracts  for  a certain  risk  can  only  be  bought  by those  agents  who  insured  (part  of)  the 
risk  initially, 
_  prices  are  not  necessarily  expected  values  with  respect  to  some  price  density, 
-  financial  markets  are  included  in the  model, 
-  there  are  two  time  periods,  at  date  zero  prices  for  (re)insurance  and  financial  assets  are  paid,  at  date 
one  risks  occur  and  assets  pay  off. 
We  will proceed  in the  following  way: in Section  3, we will motivate  why  a general  equilibrium  model 
for  a  mixed  financial-reinsurance  market  should  be  different  from  a  general  equilibrium  model  for  a 
purely  financial  market.  We  will  come  to  the  conclusion  that  the  right  framework  for  these  mixed 
markets  is  the  one  for  incomplete  markets  with  trading  constraints.  In  Section  4,  we  treat  the  mixed 
financial-reinsurance  market  in detail.  So we  consider  a market  where  reinsurance  contracts  as well  as 
financial  assets  can  be  traded.  We  prove  that  equilibria  exist,  and  we  study  the  structure  of  the 
equilibrium  prices.  In  Section  5, we  show  that  the  introduction  of  trading  constraints  can  have  drastic 
effects  on  the  structure  of  the  equilibrium  prices.  An  example  will  make  clear  that  the  no-arbitrage 
principle  can  be  violated  in  equilibrium.  Therefore  there  does  not  necessarily  exist  a  risk-neutral 
probability  distribution.  In  Section  6, we show  that  the  equilibrium  allocations  of  risk  are  in some  sense 
constrained  Pareto  optimal. 
3.  Insurance  markets  versus  financial  markets 
From  the  mathematical  point  of view,  there  is no  difference  between  a (re)insurance  contract  and  any 
other  financial  asset  such  as for  instance  equity  of  a firm.  Indeed,  both  have  a deterministic  price,  and  a 
stochastic  payoff  at  a later  date.  So they  both  are  fully  described  by 
-  a  random  variable  A:  R  +  R, where  R  is the  state  space.  For  each  state  s E R,  A(s)  denotes  the 
payoff  of  the  asset  or  (re)insurance  contract  at  date  one  if the  world  is in state  s. 
-  A price  9 E R to be  paid  at  date  zero. 
The  difference  lies in the  way they  are  traded.  Suppose  for  example  that  a certain  agent  (called  agent 
1) insures  a  certain  house  against  fire.  Then  every  insurance  agent  is  allowed  to  write  a  reinsurance 
contract  on  that  house,  but  agent  1 is the  only  agent  who  is allowed  to buy  such  a contract.  For  financial 
assets,  every  agent  is allowed  to  buy  every  asset  written  by the  other  agents.  This  example  indicates  that 
there  is a basic  difference  between  the  trade  of  (re)insurance  contracts  on  the  one  hand  and  financial 
assets  on  the  other  hand.  It  makes  clear  that  the  trade  on  (rehnsurance  markets  is constrained  by very 
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4. The  mixed  financial-reinsurance  market 
In  this  section,  we  will  give  an  appropriate  general  equilibrium  model  for  mixed  financial-reinsurance 
markets.  It  is  a  model  for  incomplete  markets  with  trading  constraints.  We  will  prove  that  equilibrium 
prices  and  allocations  of  risk  exist.  We  show  that  the  structure  of  the  equilibrium  prices  for  the 
reinsurance  contracts  is  different  from  the  structure  of  the  equilibrium  prices  in  Biihlmann’s  (1980,  1984) 
models  and  Gerber’s  (1984)  model. 
We  consider  a  market  where  I(  2  2)  agents  are  present.  Some  of  the  agents  are  (re)insurers,  indexed 
by  i EY#  fl,  the  others  are  financial  agents,  indexed  by  i E .E  By  convention,  any  agent  who  is  both 
financial  agent  and  (rehnsurer,  will  be  denoted  as  a  (rejinsurer  i ~3.  Therefore  we  can  assume  that 
3nn9=@. 
Before  any  reinsurance  took  place,  each  of  the  (relinsurers  i EY  has  a portfolio  of  risks  Xi:  a-+  W,, 
j=l,2  >...>  where  R  denotes  the  state  space  and  is  considered  to  be  finite.  In  the  sequel,  we  will  denote 
fi={l,  2,...,  S}.  It  is  clear  that,  in  deciding  how  these  risks  should  be  redistributed,  financial  markets 
can  play  a very  important  role.  Indeed,  they  provide  a means  to  invest  premiums.  Therefore,  we  consider 
consider  a  model  where  redistribution  of  risks  is  combined  with  the  possibility  of  asset  trading. 
We  denote  K  for  the  number  of  assets  that  can  be  traded,  and  J  for  the  number  of  risks  to  be 
redistributed.  The  case  of  redistribution  of  risk  without  asset  trading,  i.e.  K  =  0  (as  in  Biihlmann  (1980, 
1984)  and  Gerber  (1984))  is  a  special  case  of  our  model. 
Since  the  state  space  R  consists  of  S  states,  any  stochastic  variable  (and  therefore  the  payoff  of  any 
(re)insurance  contract  or  financial  asset)  is  fully  defined  by  a vector  A  =  (A,,  A,,  . . . , A,)’  E Rs, where 
for  each  s E R,  A,Y denotes  the  value  of  the  stochastic  variable  in  state  s. 
Notations 
_  Let  R  denote  the  S  x  J  matrix  of  risks  to  be  redistributed.  So,  for  each  s E  11, 2,.  . . , SJ and  for  each 
jE{l,  2,.  . . , _I},  R,,  E  [w,  denotes  the  claim  height  to  be  paid  for  risk  j  in  state  s.  We  denote  y,  for 
the  price  of  reinsuring  risk  j.  As  in  Gerber  (1984),  the  price  of  reinsuring  a fraction  p  E  [O, 11 of  risk  j 
equals  p yj.  We  denote  y  for  the  vector  y  =  (y,,  y2,.  . . , yJ>. 
-  For  each  insurer  i EY  and  each  risk  j  E  (1,  2,.  . . , J},  we  denote  ci  E  [0,  11 for  the  fraction  of  that  risk 
carried  by  that  insurer  (before  redistribution  takes  place).  We  allow  for  the  possibility  that  before 
reinsurance,  some  of  the  risks  Rj  are  covered  by  several  agents  on  a  proportional  basis,  if  not,  cj 
would  be  equal  to  zero  or  one  for  all  agents  i E  11,  2,.  . . , I}  and  all  contracts  j  E  11,  2,.  . . , Jj. 
Furthermore, 
cc;=1  for  all  jE{1,2  ,...,  J}. 
is9 
_  Let  C  denote  the  S  x  K  matrix  of  financial  assets.  So,  for  each  s E  (1,  2,.  . . , S)  and  for  each  k E 11, 
2 >...>  K},  asset  k  promises  the  delivery  of  C,,  units  of  account  in  state  s.  We  denote  qk  for  the  price 
of  asset  k.  We  denote  q  for  the  vector  q =  (ql,  q2,.  . . , qK). 
-  We  denote  A  =  (C  I R)  for  the  S x  (K  + J)  matrix  where  the  first  K  columns  are  financial  assets,  and 
the  last  J  columns  are  risks. 
-  A  portfolio  consists  of  a  column  vector  z  =  (z,,  .Q, . . , , zK)’  E RK  of  numbers  of  assets,  and  a  column 
vector  U =  (ai,  uz,,  . . , uJ)’  E P  of  numbers  of  reinsurance  contracts.  We  will  denote  (q,  y> = 
(q,,  q2,.  . .,qK,  yl,  y2 ,...,  yJ>,  (z,u)=(z,,  z2 ,...,  zK,u1,u2  ,...  ,u,),  and  (:)=(z,,  z2 ,...  ,zK,  ul, 
L’  u  >‘.  2,“‘>  .I 
Definition  4.1.  A  risk  position  is  a vector  x  E  IRS+‘,  where 
l  x0  is  the  wealth  at  date  zero, 
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For  each  vector  x =  (x0,  x,,  . . . , xS)’  E  [w’+‘,  we  denote  x1  for  the  date  one  components,  i.e.  x,  =  (x,, 
x2,.  . ., XJ. 
The  initial  risk  position  of  agent  i E {l,  2,.  . , Z}  (before  trading  of  reinsurance  and  assets)  will  be 
denoted  w i. 
Through  the  trade  of  reinsurance  contracts  and  financial  assets,  the  agents  can  obtain  new  risk 
positions.  The  problem  now  is  to  search  for  a  redistribution  of  risks  and  a  trade  of  assets  such  that  each 
agent  iE{l,  2,...,  I}  obtains  a  risk  position  that  maximizes  his  utility  (according  to  his  personal 
preference  relation  >  i  on  risk  positions). 
The  trade  of  (rehnsurance  is restricted  by  a very  important  condition,  namely  the  fact  that  reinsurance 
contracts  for  a  risk  can  only  be  bought  by  those  agents  who  insured  the  risk  initially.  Furthermore,  risks 
are  redistributed  amongst  insurance  agents  only.  Financial  agents  are  not  allowed  to  trade  reinsurance 
contracts.  Therefore,  we  define  in  the  following  definition  the  set  of  portfolios  Z’  c  RKfJ  that  can  be 
traded  by  agent  i,  for  all  i E 11, 2,.  . . , I}. 
Definition  4.2.  We  define  the  trade  set  of  an  insurance  agent  i EY  as  follows: 
Z’=lPX  fi  -m,$]. 
j=l  1 
We  define  the  trade  set  of  an  financial  agent  i E 9  as  follows: 
2’  =  RK x  {OjJ. 
The  interpretation  is  as  follows: 
z E  lRK implies  that  agent  i  is  allowed  to  sell  and  buy  assets  without  restrictions. 
For  insurers,  tij I  cj  for  j  E  (1,  2,..  ., J)  implies  that  agent  i  is  allowed  to  reinsure  part  of  (and 
maximum  all  of)  the  risk  that  he  initially  insured.  For  financial  agents,  uj =  0  implies  that  they  are  not 
allowed  to  trade  reinsurance. 
As  stated  before,  agents  will  trade  in  order  to  maximize  their  utility  over  the  set  of  risk  positions  that 
they  can  obtain  by  means  of  an  allowed  trade  of  assets  and  reinsurance.  With  the  previous  notations,  we 
see  that  this  set  equals 
xo=w;-qz-yv 
B’(q,  y,  A,  Zi)  =  XEX’  13(t,  v)  EZi: 
K  .I 
x,=w,‘+  c  Cskzk+  ~Rsjuj,  s~{1,2  ,...,  S} 
k=l  j=l 
=  XEXi  13(2,  v)  EZ’:  x=w’+ 
i  (  -‘y’)(f))7 
where  Xi  denotes  the  set  of  risk  positions  from  which  agent  i  wants  to  choose  an  optimal  one. 
This  finally  allows  us  to  define  equilibrium  prices  and  allocations  for  mixed  financial-reinsurance 
markets: 
Definition  4.3.  A system  of  reinsurance  prices  (rr,  y2,.  . . , yJ> E k’  and  asset  prices  (sr,  q2,.  . . , qK)  E RK 
is  an  equilibrium  price  system  if  and  only  if  there  exist  risk  positions  5’  E Xi,  i E 11, 2,. . . , I},  and 
portfolios  (Z’,  L”) E Z’,  i E  (1,  2,.  . . , I},  satisfying  the  following  conditions: 
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Xi *‘y  for  all  y  EB’(q,  y,  A,  Zi), 
izi=O,  ii;i=O. 
i=l  i=l 
The  corresponding  allocation  (Xi:  i E  11, 2,.  . . , Z}} will  be  called  an  equilibrium  allocation. 
(2b) 
(2c) 
Assumptions  k 
A,.  The  preference  relations  of  the  agents  are  continuous,  strictly  monotone  and  convex  (see  for 
instance  Debreu  (1972)  or  Hildenbrand  and  Kit-man  (1988)). 
A*.  There  is  no  redundancy  in  the  financial  assets  C,,  k E  {l,  2,.  . . , K),  i.e.  rank(C)  =  K. 
A.3.  (C>  n  (R)  =  (01. 
A‘$.  For  all  j~{l,  2 ,...,  J},  Rj E  E?:\(O). 
&.  For  all  i E  {l,  2,.  . . , Z}, Xi  is  bounded  from  below,  closed  and  convex,  and  wi  E  int(X’). 
Remarks.  (i)  It  is  clear  that  assumption  A,  can  be  made  without  loss  of  generality.  Indeed,  since  there 
are  no  constraints  on  the  trade  of  financial  assets,  the  problem  can  always  be  written  such  that  A,  is 
satisfied. 
(ii)  Assumption  A,  says  that  there  is  no  financial  portfolio  that  exactly  duplicates  a  reinsurance 
portfolio.  This  is  very  reasonable  because  the  set  of  states  s  which  influence  the  payoff  of  reinsurance 
(fire,  accidents,.  . . > is  different  from  the  set  of  states  that  influence  the  payoff  of  financial  assets  (politics, 
economics,  . . . 1. 
The  aim  now  is to  prove  that,  under  these  assumptions,  equilibria  exist,  i.e.  problem  (2)  has  a solution. 
In  the  sequel,  we  will  denote  AS(Z)  for  the  asymptotic  cone  of  a  set  Z  c  RKtJ,  and  Ker(A)  for  the 
null  space  of  the  matrix  A,  so for  each  i E  11, 2,.  . . , I},  we  have 
AQZ’) = ((  $ 
I 
EZ’lforall  tE[W+:  t  E  EZi  ,  (1  1 
and 
Lemma  4.1.  By Definition  4.2,  we have for  all i E  (1,  2,.  . . , I): 
(1)  Z’  is a closed  and  convex  subset  of  [WKfJ, 
(2)  0 E z’. 
Furthermore, 
(3)  0 E  int(C!,  r$). 
Zf assumptions  A,,  A*,,  A-,  are  satisfied,  we have 
(4)  Ker(  A)  n AS(Z’)  =  {O} for  all i E  (1,  2, . . . , Zl. 
Proof.  (1)  is  clear. 
(2)  and  (3)  follow  from  the  fact  that  for  all  j  E  {l,  2,.  . . , J),  we  have 
c  cj=l, 
it9 
cj  E  [O,l]  for  all  i EY. A.  De  Waegenaere  /  Insurance:  Mathematics  and  Economics  14  (1994)  205-218  213 
We  will  now  show  that  (4)  is  satisfied.  For  each  insurer  i EY  we  have 
AS(  Zi)  =  IRK x  RJ . 
Now  suppose  that  (z)’  E  KeGI)  nAS(Z’).  By  assumption  A,,  this  implies  that  Cz  =  0 and  Ru  =  0.  From 
assumption  A,  it  then  follows  that  z =  0. Now  since  zjj 5  0 for  all  j  E (1,  2,.  . . , J}  it  follows  from  A,  that 
Rsjvj  =  0  for  all  states  s E {l,  2,.  . . , S} and  for  all  contracts  j  E  (1,  2,.  . . , J}.  Now  A,  implies  that  for  each 
contract  j  E  (1,  2,.  . . , J),  there  is  at  least  one  state  s E  (1,  2,.  . . , S}  such  that  Rsj  >  0.  Therefore,  it 
follows  that  u =  0. 
For  financial  agents  i E 9,  the  idea  is  analogous. 
Theorem  4.1.  Under  assumptions  A*,  the mixed financial-reinsurance  market  can  reach  equilibrium  prices 
and  equilibrium  allocations. 
Proof.  Trivial  consequence  of  Lemma  4.1  and  Theorem  2.4.1  in  De  Waegenaere  (1993). 
5.  Properties  of  equilibrium  prices 
In  Section  4 we  proved  that,  under  certain  (rather  weak)  conditions  on  the  structure  of  the  contracts, 
equilibria  exist.  A  very  interesting  question  is whether  a  relation  can  be  found  between  the  equilibrium 
prices  and  C.A.P.M.  pricing,  as  in  the  case  of  Miiller’s  paper  (Miiller  (1986)). 
It  is  well  known  that  for  incomplete  markets  without  trading  constraints  (Z’  =  RL,  for  all  i E  {l, 
2 ,...,  I},  where  L denotes  the  number  of  contracts),  equilibrium  prices  are  arbitrage  free.  This  means 
that  it  is  impossible  that  for  a  matrix  of  asset  returns  A E  [wsxL,  there  exist  equilibrium  asset  prices  (ql, 
q2,...,  qJ  E  RL,  such  that  there  exists  a  portfolio  z E  lRL satisfying 
-4  ( 1  A 
z> 0, 
i.e.  by  buying  this  portfolio,  the  agent  can  only  gain,  because  the  price  of  the  portfolio  is  negative 
(qz  I  O), and  the  payoff  of  the  portfolio  is positive  in  each  state  ((AZ),  2  0,  s  E  (1,  2,.  . . , S}), with  at  least 
one  strict  inequality. 
If  prices  are  arbitrage  free,  we  know  that  there  exists  a  risk-neutral  probability  distribution  such  that 
equilibrium  asset  prices  are  the  (discounted)  expected  value  of  the  asset  payoff  with  respect  to  this 
probability  distribution.  Therefore,  in  unconstrained  markets,  equilibrium  prices  are  C.A.P.M.  prices.  In 
the  next  example  however,  we  show  that  the  mixed  financial-reinsurance  markets  we  studied  in  Section 
4  may  allow  for  limited  arbitrage  possibilities  at  equilibrium.  As  a  consequence,  there  does  not 
necessarily  exist  a  risk-neutral  probability  distribution! 
Example.  We  consider  an  economy  with  two  insurance  agents,  three  assets  (a  riskless  bond  and  two 
reinsurance  contracts,  so  J =  2  and  K  =  l),  and  four  possible  states  at  date  one.  The  matrix  of  returns 
A=(CIR)eIW 4x(1+2)  is  given  by 
We  consider  the  case  of  proportional  redistribution  of  insured  risks.  Before  redistribution,  there  are  two 
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reinsurance  for  a  maximum  of  50%  of  the  risk.  There  is  no  constraint  on  the  trade  of  the  riskless  bond. 
Therefore,  the  trade  sets  of  the  agents  are  given  by 
Z’=R  x]  -  00,i12,  i =  1,2. 
The  initial  risk  position  of  agent  1 is  equal  to 
(+!I,  w:,  w:,  w:,  wl)  =  (5.5,5,4.5,4,4). 
The  initial  risk  position  of  agent  2  is  equal  to 
(wo’, w:,  w;,  w:,  wj)  =  (11.5,  12,  12.5,13,  13). 
The  utility  functions  of  the  agents  are  of  the  form: 
So  the  problem  we  have  to  solve  is  whether  there  exist  prices  9  for  the  bond,  and 
reinsurance  contracts  such  that  there  exist  risk  positions  X’ EBi(q,  y,  A,  Z’)  satisfying 
x’  E  argmax  u’(x), 
x=W(q,  y, A, 2’) 
xl  +x2=w’+&  > 
where 
yl,  y2  for  the 
(3a) 
(3b) 
X”  =  -  qz  -  Yl"1  -  Y2c’2 
\ 
B’(q, Y,  A,  q  =  x  E  rw:  13(  2,  c)  E  z’: 
x,=wf+  , 
s 
Since  rank(A)  =  3,  we  know  that  for  each  (q,  y,,  y2),  there  exists  a  vector  7~~ =  (rI,  r2,  73,  ~4)  E  R4, 
such  that  (4,  yl,  y2)  =  T,A.  Therefore  problem  (3)  is  equivalent  to  the  following  problem:  do  there  exist 
state  prices  rS  E  R,  s =  1,  2,  3,  4,  such  that  there  exist  X’ ESB’(~,  A,  Z’)  satisfying 
X’  E  argmax  ui(  x) 
XE~“(P,  A,  2’) 
and 
,f-‘+~2=wl+w2  3 
where  rO  =  1,  T  =  (TV,  T,)  E  R5  and  for  i =  1, 2, 
(  7Tx =  7rw’ 
LB’(T,A,Z’)=  XEIW:I  1 
x2  -x,  SW;-wl,+ 
x2 
_x  SW’ 
3  2 -  w;  + 




1  . 
-2 I 
Using  the  technique  of  Lagrange  multipliers  (see  for  instance  Luenberger  (197311,  we  see  quite  easily 
that  for  a  =  8,  b  =  4,  c =  8,  d  =  2,  r  =  (1,  2,  -  1,  1,  1) is  an  equilibrium  price  system  with  corresponding 
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Furthermore,  it  is  clear  that  (t)  =  (-  i,  f,  i>Y E Z’  n  Z2>  is  an  arbitrage  possibility.  Indeed,  9  =  3, 
yi  =  1,  y2 =  1 and 
’  1 
(-‘y’i(;)=  i  >o. 
0 
,O, 
So  in  this  example,  we  clearly  have  an  equilibrium  price  system  which  violates  the  no  arbitrage 
principle  and  therefore,  there  does  not  exist  a  risk-neutral  probability.  So  equilibrium  reinsurance  prices 
are  not  necessarily  C.A.P.M.  prices. 
In  the  next  theorem,  we  show  that  for  the  equilibrium  prices  of  the  financial  assets  in  the  mixed 
financial-reinsurance  market,  there  still  exists  a  risk-neutral  probability  such  that  equilibrium  prices  are 
discounted  expected  values  with  respect  to  this  probability  distribution.  The  equilibrium  prices  for 
reinsurance  contracts  however,  are  bounded  above  by  the  discounted  expected  value  of  their  payoff  with 
respect  to  the  same  probability  distribution.  First  we  need  a  lemma. 
Lemma  5.1.  A  system  of  inequalities 
i 
fk(z)  20  kE  {1,2,...,K} 
g,(z)  20  I=  (1,2  )...,  L}, 
has a solution  z  that satisfies fk( z)  # 0 for  some  k E { 1, 2, . . . , K},  if and  only  if there  does  not  exist  (T, 
A) E rw:,  x  lR$  such  that 
Proof.  Is  a  slight  modification  of  a  proof  by  Fan  (1956). 
Theorem  5.1.  For  all equilibrium prices  (q,  y)  E RK+“,  there exists a vector  T E IX:+  such  that: 
qk=(rC)k  VkE(1,2  ,...,  K}, 
yjS(TR)j  VjE{1,2  ,...,  J}. 
Proof.  Clearly  for  each  insurer  i EY  we  have 
AS(  Zi)  =  IRK  x  rW<, 
and  for  each  financial  agent  i E F,  we  have 
AS(  Z’)  =  RK x  IO}“. 
Now  we  know  that  (see  for  instance  De  Waegenaere  (1993))  the  set  of  equilibrium  prices  is  a  subset  of 
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Now  we  define  two  systems  of  inequalities 
i 
fs(z,u)  = (A(;))$0 Vs={1,2  ,...,  S} 




fO(Z>  u>  =  -(4,  Y)(  ;)  20 
(f,(z,,:)=(#)~20  Vse{1,2  )...)  S}  (S,) 
\ 
gj(z,U)  =uj=O  Vje{1,2  ,...,  .I}. 
Then  (4,  r>  @ Q  if  and  only  if  one  of  the  systems  of  inequalities  S,  or  S,  has  a  solution  satisfying 
%E{O,l,..  .,S}:  fs(z,  L’) zo.  (4) 
But  clearly,  this  is  equivalent  to  the  statement  that  S,  has  a  solution  satisfying  (4).  By  Lemma  5.1,  this  is 
equivalent  to  the  statement  that  there  does  not  exist  a vector  (r,  A) =  (~a,  rrI,.  . . , rs,  A,,  A,,  . . . , A,)  E 
Rtz’  x  rW<  with 
r&k=(r&)k  VkE{1,2,...,K), 
rro~j=(r,R)j-Aj  Vje{1,2  ,...,  J).  (5) 
So,  (q,  y> E  Q  if  and  only  if  there  exists  a vector  rr E  Rt+  satisfying 
qk=(&)k  VkE{1,2  ,...,  K), 
yjYil(7TR)j  Vje{l,2  ,...,  I}. 
Since  equilibrium  prices  are  in  (2,  this  concludes  the  proof. 
So  if  there  is  a  riskless  bond  available  on  the  financial  market,  i.e.  one  of  the  columns  of  C  equals  (1, 
, . . . , l)‘,  then  the  equilibrium  prices  of  assets  and  risks  satisfy  1 
&=@P[Ck]  VkE(1,2,...,K}, 
rjI~~p[Rj]  tlj=  (1,2  ,...,  .I},  (6) 
s 
where  4’ =  a&l,  1,.  . . , 1)’ =  c  rrs  denotes  the  price  of  the  riskless  bond,  and  E,  denotes  the  expected 
s=l 
value  of  the  corresponding  stochastic  variable  with  respect  to  the  probability  measure  P  on  the  state 
space  0,  given  by 
P({s})  =  +,  se{1,2  )...)  9. 
f  1=t 
The  example  at  the  beginning  of  this  section  makes  clear  that  it  is  possible  that  for  some  equilibrium 
prices  y  of  reinsurance,  there  does  not  exist  a  probability  distribution  that  gives  an  equality  in  (61, 
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6. Constrained  Pareto  optimality 
It  is  easy  to  see  that  the  equilibrium  allocations  for  the  mixed  financial-reinsurance  markets  defined 
in  Section  4  are  constrained  Pareto  optimal  in  the  sense  that  there  does  not  exist  another  redistribution 
of  risk  and  assets  satisfying  the  constraints  defined  by  the  sets  Z’  such  that  every  agent  is  better  off,  and 
at  least  one  agent  is  strictly  better  of.  Formally,  this  means  that  we  define  the  set  of  feasible  allocations 
as  follows: 
g-T:=  xf,  zi  1  ( i 11 
f  I  xf=wi+A  T 
i .I  V’ 
Vi  E  {1,2,.  . . , I) 
Vi  i=l,...,I 
E  LJYpixzi)  I 
jTzi=O,  ivi=o,  ix;=  iwb  ’ 
i=l  i=l  i=l  i=l 
I 
Then  for  equilibrium  allocations  ((Xi,  (:I)‘):  i E  (1,  2,.  . . , Z}} E nl!=,(Xi  x Z’)  there  do  not  exist  new 




Zi  i iI  Vi 
,  iE(1,2  ,...,  I}  ELF 
1 
I 
ViE{1,2,...,  I}  : d(  xi)  2 zi(  Xi) 
3iE{1,2,...,  I}:  uyxq  > ui(Xi). 
The  proof  can  be  found  in  De  Waegenaere  (1993). 
Furthermore,  we  would  like  to  remark  that,  even  if  we  would  consider  the  case  of  von  Neumann- 
Morgenstem  utilities,  we  would  not  get  the  same  characterization  of  Pareto  optimal  exchanges  as  in  the 
models  of  Biihlmann  (1980,  1984)  or  Gerber  (1984).  Clearly,  the  reason  for  this  difference  is  that  in  these 
models  the  only  constraint  that  matters  in  finding  Pareto  optimal  allocations  is  the  market  clearing 
constraint.  In  our  model  however,  each  of  the  agents  faces  his  own  trading  constraints,  defined  in  the 
sets  Z’,  i E  11, 2,.  . . , I).  Therefore,  it  is  clear  that  one  cannot  expect  to  get  the  same  result. 
7.  Concluding  remarks 
The  main  issue  in  this  paper  was  to  show  that  the  mixed  financial-reinsurance  markets  can  reach  an 
equilibrium,  but  that  the  structure  of  the  equilibrium  prices  can  be  drastically  influenced  by  the  existence 
of  trading  constraints.  Indeed,  if  the  trade  of  reinsurance  contracts  is  constrained  by  the  fact  that 
reinsurance  for  a  risk  can  only  be  bought  by  those  agents  who  insured  the  risk  initially,  then  limited 
arbitrage  possibilities  may  exist  at  equilibrium.  As  a  consequence,  these  equilibrium  prices  cannot  be 
considered  as  being  the  discounted  expected  value  of  the  payoffs  with  respect  to  some  probability 
measure  on  the  state  space  LL Equilibrium  prices  therefore  have  a different  structure  than  in  the  models 
of  Biihlmann  (1980,  1984)  and  Gerber  (1984). 
Finally,  I  would  like  to  remark  that  it  is  not  essential  that  we  restrict  ourselves  in  Section  4  to  the 
trade  of  reinsurance.  The  results  remain  valid  if  one  includes  the  insurance  market.  It  was  only  for 
notational  convenience  that  we  restricted  to  reinsurance.  The  restriction  to  two  time  periods  is  also  not 
essential,  and  only  made  for  notational  convenience.  We  could  as  well  consider  assets  and  reinsurance 
contracts  paying  off  at  different  times  in  the  future.  We  would  only  have  to  redefine  the  state  space. 218  A.  De  Waegenaere/Insurance:  Mathematics  and  Economics  14  (1994)  205-218 
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